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Abstract
The design and use of standard processes are foundational recommendations in many operations practices.
Yet, given the demonstrated performance benefits of standardized processes, it is surprising that they are often
not followed consistently. One way to ensure greater compliance is by electronically monitoring the activities
of individuals, although such aggressive monitoring poses the risk of inducing backlash. In the setting of hand
hygiene in healthcare, a context where compliance with standard processes is frequently less than 50% and
where this lack of compliance can result in negative consequences, we investigated the effectiveness of
electronic monitoring. We did so using a unique, radio frequency identification (RFID)-based system
deployed in 71 hospital units. We found that electronically monitoring individual compliance resulted in a
large, positive increase in compliance. We also found that there was substantial variability in the effect across
units and that units with higher levels of preactivation compliance experienced increased benefits from
monitoring relative to units with lower levels of prepreactivation compliance. By observing compliance rates
over three and a half years, we investigated the persistent effects of individual monitoring and found that
compliance rates initially increased before they gradually declined. Additionally, in multiple units, individual
monitoring was discontinued, allowing for an investigation of the impact of removing the intervention on
compliance. Surprisingly, we found that, after removal, compliance rates declined to below prepreactivation
levels. Our findings suggest that, although individual electronic monitoring can dramatically improve process
compliance, it requires sustained managerial commitment.
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Abstract 
 
The design and use of standard processes are foundational recommendations in many operations practices. 
Yet, given the demonstrated performance benefits of standardized processes, it is surprising that they are 
often not followed consistently. One way to ensure greater compliance is by electronically monitoring the 
activities of individuals, although such aggressive monitoring poses the risk of inducing backlash. In the 
setting of hand hygiene in healthcare – a context where compliance with standard processes is frequently 
less than 50% and where this lack of compliance can result in negative consequences – we investigated 
the effectiveness of electronic monitoring. We did so using a unique, RFID-based system deployed in 71 
hospital units. We found that electronically monitoring individual compliance resulted in a large, positive 
increase in compliance. We also found that there was substantial variability in the effect across units and 
that units with higher levels of pre-activation compliance experienced increased benefits from monitoring 
relative to units with lower levels of pre-activation compliance. By observing compliance rates over 
three-and-a-half years, we investigated the persistent effects of individual monitoring and found that 
compliance rates initially increased before they gradually declined. Additionally, in multiple units, 
individual monitoring was discontinued, allowing for an investigation of the impact of removing the 
intervention on compliance. Surprisingly, we found that after removal, compliance rates declined to below 
pre-activation levels. Our findings suggest that although individual electronic monitoring can dramatically 
improve process compliance, it requires sustained managerial commitment. 
 
Key Words: Process Compliance, Hand washing, Electronic Monitoring, Empirical Operations 
  
1. Introduction 
Since at least the publication of Frederick Taylor’s (1911) seminal work, the creation of and 
compliance with standard processes have been key drivers of quality and productivity improvement 
within operations (Bohn 2005). Examples of standardized processes that have driven quality and 
productivity improvements include Toyota’s approach to standardizing work and then enhancing it 
through continuous improvement (Shah et al. 2008; Staats, Brunner and Upton 2011), and the ISO 9000 
system, which creates standard processes that can be adhered to and then improved over time (Corbett, 
Montes-Sancho and Kirsch 2005; Levine and Toffel 2010). Many other industries have seen operational 
performance improve as a result of standardized processes, such as software (Harter, Krishnan and 
Slaughter 2000), long-haul trucking (Baker and Hubbard 2004), and retail (DeHoratius and Raman 2008). 
Within healthcare, standard processes have become a major focus due to persistent patient safety issues 
and rising costs (IOM 1999). For example, the use of core processes in healthcare (e.g., for heart failure & 
pneumonia) commissioned by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in the US has been shown 
to yield higher quality and  more efficient care (Senot et al. 2015; Andritsos and Tang 2014).  
Given the demonstrated performance benefits frequently associated with adopting standard 
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processes, it is somewhat surprising that an ongoing challenge has been achieving consistent use of such 
processes. One way to encourage the consistent use of standard processes might be through monitoring 
individuals’ behavior either by other individuals (e.g., managers) or with technology (Ouchi 1979; Nagin 
et al. 2002). Electronic monitoring – given its low cost and omnipresent nature – seems to offer 
significant benefits in this respect (Kallman 1993; Aiello and Kolb 1995). In this investigation, we 
explore the effectiveness of electronic monitoring in overcoming the challenge of process compliance 
using the context of hand hygiene in healthcare. Since the work of Ignaz Semmelweis in the 1800s, 
healthcare professionals have known that hand washing reduces hospital-acquired infections. Despite this 
widespread knowledge, hand hygiene compliance rates often fall below 50% (CDC 2002). Recently 
emerging technologies that electronically monitor this behavior provide a reliable and unobtrusive 
approach to measuring hand hygiene compliance (Boyce 2011). 
For our investigation, we relied on data from Proventix, a company that uses a radio frequency 
identification (RFID)-based system to monitor individual healthcare workers’ hand hygiene compliance 
in hospitals. Our data included over three-and-a-half years of compliance data from caregivers in 71 
hospital units at 42 hospitals where individual electronic monitoring was deployed (encompassing 
approximately 20 million hand hygiene compliance opportunities). Our results showed that, on average, 
caregivers exhibited a large and significant increase in hand hygiene compliance after individual 
electronic monitoring was activated. We also found that there was significant variability in the activation 
effect across units and that units with higher levels of pre-activation compliance experienced larger gains 
from individual monitoring than did units with lower levels of pre-activation compliance. Our analysis of 
the persistence of compliance behavior over time revealed that the benefits of monitoring increased for 
nearly two years before they eventually started to degrade. Finally, we considered the implications of 
terminating individual electronic monitoring after an extended period of oversight. Our examination of 
termination effects in nine units at six hospitals where we were able to view compliance after monitoring 
was discontinued, showed that electronic monitoring did not lead to habit formation. Instead, surprisingly, 
we found that compliance after the removal of monitoring dropped below pre-activation levels.  
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Our results make several contributions to both theory and practice. First, we documented the 
initial, large positive effect of individual electronic monitoring across a substantial number of 
organizations using archival data, confirming that the benefits of individual monitoring dominate the risk 
of employee reactance (Frey 1993), at least on average. Second, we found that there is significant 
variability in the aforementioned effect, highlighting the need to understand what factors may drive this 
heterogeneity. Third, we showed that units with higher pre-activation hand hygiene compliance 
experienced a larger boost in compliance from monitoring than units with lower pre-activation 
compliance. Fourth, we provided tests of the long-term effects of monitoring on compliance, revealing a 
long, initial period of beneficial increases in hand hygiene compliance followed by a gradual tapering-off 
effect. Fifth, and perhaps most surprisingly, we found that compliance after the removal of individual 
monitoring was lower than compliance before monitoring was introduced. This result provides support 
for a crowding out perspective on motivation (Deci 1975) whereby employees’ internal motivation for 
compliance was replaced by external forces associated with monitoring, highlighting the limitations of 
merely monitoring desired behavior as a means of producing lasting habits. More generally, the growing 
availability of monitoring technologies, and the trace data they create, makes understanding the link 
between process compliance and electronic monitoring one that is important theoretically and practically.  
2. Process Compliance and Individual Electronic Monitoring 
 Despite the operational benefits that have been shown to result from standard processes (Taylor 
1911; Smiddy and Naum 1954), compliance rates are often low (Martin et al. 2013). For example, within 
healthcare, standard processes have been developed to improve patient care. Yet, according to US 
government statistics (http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare), compliance rates vary greatly. The 
compliance challenge is not new. In fact, Frederick Taylor referenced this problem noting that, “it is only 
through  enforced standardization of methods, enforced adoption of the best implements and working 
conditions, and enforced cooperation that this faster work can be assured. And the duty of enforcing the 
adoption of standards and enforcing this cooperation rests with management alone” (Taylor 1911: 83).  
One way to help ensure that employees adopt and comply with standard processes is monitoring 
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(Ouchi 1979). Electronic monitoring – due to its low cost and omnipresent nature – seems to offer an 
ideal way to monitor compliance (Kallman 1993; Aiello and Kolb 1995). Note that electronic monitoring 
can be done in aggregate for a unit or with respect to the individual. In this paper we are interested in 
understanding the effect of individual electronic monitoring.1 Examples of individual electronic 
monitoring currently in wide use include electronic monitoring of ethical behavior through video cameras 
in casinos, electronic monitoring of trading activity in investment banks, electronic monitoring of safety 
steps in manufacturing, and systems to monitor employee movements and actions in numerous industries.  
Individual electronic monitoring may improve compliance for several reasons. First, by making 
individuals feel accountable for their observable actions, the mere presence of electronic monitoring may 
change behavior. For example, prior work finds that simply making one’s actions visible to others may 
influence different categories of behavior ranging from voter turnout to employee theft in restaurants 
(e.g., Gerber, Green and Larimer 2008; Yoeli et al. 2013; Pierce, Snow and McAfee 2014). Further, the 
data produced by electronic monitoring can be used in compliance improvement efforts by providing 
employees with ongoing feedback, by increasing their rewards for compliance (e.g., through more 
accurately calculated piece-rate payments), or by increasing non-compliance costs (e.g., termination of 
employment or social punishment through the enforcement of norms, Nagin et al. 2002). Additionally, the 
use of monitoring may signal management’s commitment to process compliance. Notwithstanding the 
benefits of electronic monitoring, an important concern about individual electronic monitoring is that 
aggressive monitoring could be perceived as invasive and as a signal of distrust by management, which 
could result in reactance or reduced compliance (Frey 1993; Bernstein 2012).  
Thus, monitoring creates the potential for competing mechanisms. The individual setting is likely 
to determine which of these forces from electronic monitoring—its ability to generate transparency, 
feedback, incentives, and a signal of management commitment, or its risk of arousing reactance—
dominates. Factors determining employees’ response to electronic monitoring may include the 
                                                
1 For the remainder of the paper we will use the terms individual electronic monitoring and electronic monitoring interchangeably. If we wish to 
refer to electronic monitoring at an aggregate-level we will explicitly do so.  
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intrusiveness of the monitoring and the desired action’s consistency with employees’ professional and 
prosocial goals. In a setting where electronic monitoring is not intrusive and the compliance behavior is in 
line with professional and prosocial goals (e.g., to provide better patient care), we would expect: 
HYPOTHESIS 1:  Process compliance will increase, on average, after individual electronic monitoring 
is implemented. 
Prior work examining monitoring (e.g., Gerber et al. 2008; Yoeli et al. 2013; Pierce et al. 2014) 
finds that although there may be an average effect of deploying monitoring, there is also significant 
heterogeneity across contexts. We next explore one potential cause of such variability – pre-activation 
compliance. There are at least three reasons to predict that organizations with higher pre-activation 
compliance will see a greater increase after electronic monitoring implementation than will organizations 
with lower pre-activation compliance: (1) social norms; (2) organizational design; (3) management 
attention. First, social norms represent the behavior that is considered “typical” in a given context. Social 
norms have been shown to have a strong effect on individual behavior (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren 1990; 
Pierce and Snyder 2008) such that individuals respond in kind to their environmental norms. Units with 
higher pre-activation compliance may have stronger compliance norms signaling the importance of the 
targeted behavior. In such units, individuals may view compliance as a key part of the job and therefore 
embrace tools designed to help with compliance (see, Klein and Knight 2005, for a similar argument for 
innovation norms and innovation use, p. 245). For units with lower compliance norms, individuals may be 
less committed to compliance. Thus, individuals may not be as engaged with electronic monitoring or not 
as strongly value the necessity of compliance, decreasing the intervention’s effectiveness.  
Further, Cialdini et al. (1990) noted that, “norms should motivate behavior primarily when they 
are activated (i.e., made salient or otherwise focused on)” (p. 1015). When individual monitoring is 
deployed, process compliance as well as the existing norms of compliance behavior is made more salient, 
prompting individuals to behave in line with compliance norms in their environment. This process may 
create a “magnetic middle” effect (Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius 2008) whereby employees in an 
organization with strong compliance norms who previously complied below the norm level may improve 
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their compliance rates, whereas employees in an organization with weak compliance norms who 
previously complied above the norm level may decrease their compliance rates to behave consistently 
with the salient norm. Through this process, organizations with stronger compliance norms (potentially 
indicated by higher pre-activation compliance) may benefit more from activating electronic monitoring.   
Organizational design is a second reason why higher pre-activation compliance may increase the 
impact of electronic monitoring on individual compliance. Organizational design may include the 
members that are selected for the organization, as well as the operating environment’s physical design. 
With respect to the former, higher pre-activation compliance may indicate that organization members are 
more prosocially inclined (e.g., care more about patient’s health) or have a greater appreciation of the 
general need for compliance. If this is the case then these individuals may view monitoring as creating an 
opportunity to learn and improve. This would, in turn, increase the positive effect of electronic monitoring 
on the targeted behavior (c.f. Song et al. 2015). Physical design may also influence the impact of 
electronic monitoring: organizations with higher pre-activation compliance may have better-placed 
equipment which allows them to maximize the benefits that may accrue from monitoring. 
Finally, higher pre-activation compliance may indicate greater management attention to process 
compliance. Greater management attention may indicate a willingness and ability to use the information 
that is created from electronic monitoring more effectively. These managers may share the knowledge to 
motivate workers or help them learn.  Moreover, with greater management attention then individuals may 
recognize the need to respond more strongly to the deployment of individual electronic monitoring. 
Although the above reasons suggest that greater pre-activation compliance will lead to a larger 
effect from electronic monitoring deployment there is at least one boundary condition to note. If 
compliance rates are extremely high (e.g., close to 100%), then the degree of improvement following 
deployment could be limited due to ceiling effects.  However, in cases where higher compliance is not 
sufficiently high to create such a ceiling effect, we hypothesize: 
HYPOTHESIS 2:  The increase in process compliance due to the implementation of individual 
electronic monitoring will be greater among organizations with higher pre-activation 
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compliance than organizations with lower pre-activation compliance. 
2.2 Effects of Individual Electronic Monitoring over Time 
 Moving beyond the initial implementation of process compliance initiatives like electronic 
monitoring, it is imperative to understand what happens over the ensuing months and years. Does 
individual electronic monitoring maintain its effectiveness, or does it gradually lose its salience, with its 
impact diminishing over time? Despite the importance of understanding the long-term impact of 
operational interventions (Gino and Pisano 2008; Boyce 2011; Rogers and Frey 2014), the kind of 
longitudinal data necessary for examining such issues is rarely available to researchers.  
 When considering the potency of electronic monitoring effects over time, competing predictions 
are possible. One reason electronic monitoring may maintain or increase its potency is that it is always 
present. Its constant presence may suffice to maintain a constant treatment effect if employee expectations 
and management structures aligned with the deployment of monitoring remain unchanged. Moreover, 
electronic monitoring may increase compliance due to the development of habitual responses. Habits are 
psychological inclinations to engage in a past behavior (Neal et al. 2012). Research on habituation 
suggests that by continually engaging in the same set of activities, with high frequency, in similar 
contexts, without a change in stimuli, an individual is likely to build a habit such that a stimulus-response 
cycle is automatically repeated (Wood and Neal 2007). This implies that the continuous nature of 
monitoring could well result in the habituation of the monitored behavior. As the habitual responses 
become ingrained in the automatic routines of workers, compliance should increase over time, albeit at a 
decreasing rate as individuals approach 100% compliance. Supporting this perspective, single and dual 
unit studies of hospital units adopting hand hygiene monitoring technologies find that process compliance 
may improve and hold steady for up to a year and a half (Armellino et al. 2011; Walker et al. 2014).  
Other streams of research, however, suggest that monitoring may lose its potency over time, 
resulting in a gradual decline in compliance after rollout. First, individuals may become desensitized to a 
stimulus over time (Thompson and Spencer 1966; Haselhuhn et al. 2012). Similarly, signal detection 
theory suggests that over time the salience of signals typically decays with the associated behavior 
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experiencing a commensurate decline (MacMillan 2002). Second, it is possible that individuals’ 
expectations about compliance could change over time, perhaps due to management’s changing 
enforcement or emphasis, and as a result compliance behaviors may gradually decrease.  
Although the different perspectives suggest opposing effects in terms of the persistence of 
electronic monitoring on compliance, we propose that these effects may dominate over different time 
periods. Namely, we propose that initially, the positive effect dominates as habits are developed, but that 
as discussed previously, monitoring loses its saliency over time. Therefore, we propose:  
HYPOTHESIS 3:   Ceteris paribus, process compliance will exhibit an inverted-U shaped 
relationship over time after individual electronic monitoring is implemented 
such that process compliance will increase first and then decline over time 
Hypothesis 3 pertains to the persistence of individual electronic monitoring on process 
compliance. But, another important and distinct question is what happens to compliance behavior if 
monitoring is discontinued altogether. On the one hand, if habits are formed, then the discontinuation of 
monitoring should have little or no impact on behavior. Although the strength of the habit could gradually 
weaken over time with the removal of monitoring, if the behavior were truly habituated then an 
immediate and significant degradation would not expected after monitoring is turned off. This result 
would be consistent with Charness and Gneezy (2009) who found that incentives for exercise accrued 
long-term benefits even after the treatment was removed. Similarly, Allcott and Rogers (2014) found that 
informing people of neighbors’ energy usage had a lasting effect for years after such mailings were 
discontinued – although the effect did dissipate over time. Further, if the initial investment in electronic 
monitoring by management signaled a commitment to behavior change or changed workers’ beliefs about 
the importance of behavior change, higher levels of compliance should persist after monitoring removal. 
On the other hand, two factors may lead individuals to decrease their compliance after electronic 
monitoring is removed. First, electronic monitoring removal may signal to workers a lack of managerial 
commitment to encouraging this particular behavior, resulting in an updating of employee expectancies 
(i.e., process compliance is no longer a valued behavior) and a subsequent decline in compliance 
behavior. Second, there is a risk of motivational crowding out due to the implementation of electronic 
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monitoring (Deci 1975; Bénabou and Tirole 2003). Crowding out refers to the substitution of an external 
motivation for what was once done for internal purposes. One primary mechanism leading to internal 
motivation is a desire to feel competent at one’s work (Deci and Ryan 2002). Thus, an individual may 
choose to comply with a standard process, believing that it is appropriate in a given circumstance. The 
risk is that the introduction of electronic monitoring may change an individual’s decision calculus. Now, 
instead of complying with an activity for internal reasons, the individual may have her motivation shifted 
externally and thus comply for external purposes (e.g., appearing responsible in front of managers). If the 
external motivator is removed, as is the case with the discontinuation of electronic monitoring, then both 
internal and external motivation would be gone, resulting in a compliance decline for the given behavior. 
In fact, if crowding out were to occur, then not only might compliance fall, as compared to the time 
period right before the deactivation of electronic monitoring, but also a strong form of the prediction 
would suggest that compliance may fall below the level before electronic monitoring deployment.  
Although the different theoretical perspectives suggest opposite effects of terminating monitoring 
on compliance, we hypothesize that the negative effect from termination will dominate: 
HYPOTHESIS 4:   Process compliance will decline below the pre-activation level of compliance 
after individual electronic monitoring is terminated. 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy   
3.1 Setting 
We investigate our hypotheses with data from Proventix, a company that uses RFID technology 
to help healthcare providers improve hand hygiene compliance. Proventix’s system involves distributing 
RFID badges to hospital caregivers who then wear their personalized, active RFID badges along with 
their standard hospital identification. The company also installs RFID readers throughout the hospital 
unit. The RFID badges then communicate wirelessly with a network of sensors connected throughout the 
monitored area. In addition, communication units are installed on hand hygiene dispensers (both soap and 
sanitizer dispensers) within a focal hospital unit. As a result of the system, both the date and time when a 
caregiver enters the area monitored by a given sensor as well as whether or not the caregiver uses a 
dispenser are recorded. The system also records all dispenses by a dispenser, even if it is used by someone 
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without a badge. The information is then transmitted back to Proventix’s central servers. Further, each 
communication unit contains an LCD display that delivers personalized messages to caregivers wearing 
RFID badges (e.g., personalized feedback on their hand hygiene compliance rate, up-to-date weather 
forecasts, and/or professional and educational messages). 
Proventix follows a consistent process in rolling out their system. First, for each hospital unit, 
Proventix installs an RFID reader to each of the hand hygiene dispensers. Proventix strives to fit its 
system into the existing infrastructure of the hospital unit, so new dispensers are not typically deployed 
and the location of existing dispensers is not normally changed. The RFID readers, called 
communications units, collect dispensing data, measure caregiver movement through the care area, and 
provide point of care messaging intended to inform and engage caregivers as they cleanse their hands. 
Once the communication units have been installed, Proventix is able to track dispenser usage in a hospital 
unit. We refer to this date as the “installation date.” At the installation date, aggregate electronic 
monitoring is possible, but individual electronic monitoring is not possible, as individuals are not yet 
badged and so dispenser usage data is not linked to individual caregivers. During the time period after 
communication units have been installed, Proventix seeks to gather baseline dispenser usage data in order 
to create a reference point for evaluating future compliance behavior. After the installation date, but prior 
to the full-scale rollout of individual monitoring, a small subset of caregivers, who are selected by the 
hospital units, are designated as pilot testers. These individuals receive an active RFID badge and wear 
their badge at work. At this stage, Proventix does not share pilot testers’ compliance statistics with 
hospital management. 
Proventix’s next stage in the implementation process is to assign badges to caregivers and 
commence individual monitoring. This stage is typically rolled out several months after the “installation 
date”. We refer to this date hereafter as the “activation date.” From the activation date on, Proventix 
monitors individual caregivers’ hand hygiene performance. Before the activation date, Proventix holds 
information sessions and distributes handouts to explain how the monitoring system works and how hand 
hygiene compliance rates are calculated.  
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Although Proventix recommends to hospitals that as many caregivers as possible receive RFID 
badges, it is ultimately the hospital’s choice as to which caregivers receive a badge. Traditionally all 
nursing staff and patient care technicians within a unit receive a badge. However, that still leaves many 
caregivers who do not receive badges. According to Proventix, not providing badges to employees in 
certain roles is typical because those individuals spend only a part of their time in a given unit (e.g., temp 
nurses, nurses from other units, residents on rounds, dieticians, housekeeping staff, transporters, 
therapists, physicians). Proventix records roles for individuals who are assigned badges. We confirmed 
that most caregivers who received a badge were nurses (71.5%) or patient care technicians (12.08%). 
During our study period from February 2010 to August 2013, 42 hospitals (including 71 hospital 
units) rolled out Proventix’s monitoring system2 and twelve of these hospital units at nine hospitals 
discontinued electronic monitoring. We note that, in our sample, a majority of the hospital units that 
removed individual monitoring did so because the funding for monitoring came from an outside grant and 
at the expiration of the grant they either did not have or chose not to deploy internal funding to continue 
the service. For three units, Proventix stopped tracking dispenser usage after reclaiming caregivers’ 
badges. However, for the remaining nine hospital units, Proventix continued to record the date and time 
of every dispenser used for several months after RFID badges were collected. These nine hospital units 
provided us with an opportunity to examine whether and how deactivating electronic monitoring affects 
dispenser usage. The date when Proventix collected RFID badges from a given hospital unit is hereafter 
referred to as the “deactivation date.” Figure 1 demarcates the three dates relevant to our analysis. 
Proventix has developed a standardized measurement system to identify situations when hand 
hygiene is expected. When a caregiver stays in a patient’s room for 20 seconds or longer – a length of 
time that Proventix has deemed from expert consultation to be sufficient for hand hygiene to be clinically 
relevant – the room entry and room exit associated with the stay in question are classified as hand hygiene 
opportunities. Guidelines from groups such as the WHO recommend that hand hygiene be conducted on 
                                                
2 Proventix provided information on one additional hospital unit. However, in this unit, all observations happened in cleaning rooms. We 
excluded this unit from all analyses, but our results were robust to including these observations.  
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both entry and exit. By default, a 90-second “window” is allocated for caregivers entering a patient’s 
room (60 seconds before entry and 30 seconds after entry are included in this window) and exiting a 
patient’s room (30 seconds before exit and 60 seconds after exit are included in this window) to sanitize 
their hands in order to be deemed compliant with a given hand hygiene opportunity. See Appendix A for 
more details about the hand hygiene measurement system. 
An important question is what additional changes with respect to hand hygiene occur when 
Proventix activates individual monitoring. First, to accurately capture baseline hand hygiene compliance 
rates, Proventix recommends its clients not to make other practice changes at the time of system 
activation. As noted by a Proventix executive, “Hospital education is primarily technical at the time of 
badging and is intended to answer basic questions and establish caregiver confidence in the system.” The 
executive referred to technical training as an opportunity to reinforce the importance of wearing the badge 
properly to make sure that caregivers receive “credit” for their hand hygiene compliance. Proventix’s 
standard practice is to distribute to the client the first performance reports after a 30-day post-activation 
compliance baseline is established.  Managers have the ability to review caregivers’ compliance behavior 
within these 30 days but are encouraged not to introduce interventions such as compliance-based rewards 
and goal-setting until after the baseline period has ended.  Examining data provided by Proventix 
describing interventions eventually deployed by some hospital units (summarized in the next paragraph) 
we find that none of the units in our sample implemented incentives in the first 60 days post-activation 
and only five units implemented performance feedback posting within the first 30 days post-activation. 
After a baseline of compliance use is established and technical training has been completed, 
Proventix works with its hospital clients to structure interventions that may further increase compliance 
rates. Proventix classifies these interventions into five categories: performance feedback (e.g., individual 
hand hygiene compliance rates are openly posted), goal-setting (e.g., a group compliance goal is posted in 
the unit), competition (e.g., unit staff are divided into teams that compete to improve their compliance), 
leadership (senior level leaders demonstrate active and visible participation in the program), and 
incentives (e.g., goal-based financial incentives are set based on hand hygiene compliance rates). 
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Retrospectively, Proventix sought to identify the presence and timing of these interventions and was able 
to do so for 50 hospital units. We do not include controls for these interventions in the main analyses we 
reported in Section 4; however, we explore them further in Section 5.1. We note that the results for all 
hypotheses remain meaningfully unchanged in direction and significance with their inclusion.  
The setting we study has a number of advantages for an exploration of the impact of individual 
electronic monitoring on compliance. First, 71 hospital units rolled out electronic monitoring over the 
course of three years, and activation dates varied across hospital units. Activation dates were distributed 
between May 2010 and August 2013 (see Appendix B for more details on activation timing). This 
staggered roll-out allows us to isolate the effects of activating individual electronic monitoring on 
dispenser usage from the effects of other potentially confounding factors, such as general trends over time 
in hand hygiene compliance and the rollout of various public health campaigns. Second, the large number 
of hospital units involved in this study allows us to examine whether and why there is variability in the 
monitoring effect across hospital units. Third, the three-year longitudinal panel data allow us to explore 
whether the initial effects of activating electronic monitoring are strengthened over time or instead decay. 
The fourth advantage of this setting is that for some hospitals, electronic monitoring was discontinued, 
allowing us to evaluate the effects of the removal of monitoring on compliance behavior. 
3.2 Data 
To answer our research questions we would ideally have process compliance data for individuals 
working within a hospital during the three stages in Figure 1: (1) Pre-activation; (2) Post-activation; and 
(3) Post-deactivation. Unfortunately, it was not possible to precisely examine compliance for all 
caregivers at the first and third stages since it was the use of individual electronic monitoring that 
permitted us to examine all individuals’ compliance decisions. To examine the effects of activating and 
deactivating individual electronic monitoring (Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4), we used data on dispenser usage 
and explored process compliance at the hospital unit-level. Since we were unable to distinguish usage 
generated by caregivers who were eventually badged from usage generated by others in the pre-activation 
period, we examined how total usage by all users changed following the activation and deactivation of 
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monitoring. Prior to badge activation and post badge deactivation, Proventix tracked use of hand hygiene 
dispensers. Therefore, after controlling for other factors, an increase in dispenser use within units 
following the rollout of individual electronic monitoring would indicate an increase in hand washing and 
thus process compliance. Similarly, examining how dispenser use changed after monitoring was removed 
provided insight into our hypothesis regarding the termination of individual electronic monitoring. 
In addition to the dispenser-level data, we also had information on individual compliance about 
caregivers who ever received a badge during our study period. After individual monitoring was turned on, 
we investigated whether individuals complied each time they had a hand hygiene opportunity. We used 
these data to examine the persistence question (Hypothesis 3). Below we provide more detail about each 
data set (unit- and individual-level compliance data). 
3.2.1 Unit–Level Process Compliance Data. The first dataset included records from each of the 71 
hospital units on each day prior to August 31, 2013 (the end of our study period). We observed two data 
points per day per unit: (1) a record of how many times dispensers in this unit were used each day by 
someone wearing an RFID badge (“badged users”), and (2) a record of how many times unit dispensers 
were used on a given day by someone who was not wearing an RFID badge (“unbadged users”). Before 
each department’s activation date, only pilot testers wore badges, and the vast majority of users were 
unbadged. After the electronic monitoring activation date, some caregivers received badges and became 
badged users, and unbadged users include caregivers who do not have a badge, visitors, and patients. 
 Our final unit-level dataset included 35,552 observations for 71 hospital units in 42 hospitals. 
Twenty-six hospitals were located in Alabama; the remaining 16 were spread across eight other U.S. 
states (Arizona, California, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
Thirty-one of these hospitals were located in urban areas; eleven were in rural areas. The number of 
staffed beds across hospitals ranged from 25 to 1,097 (M = 270, SD = 233.16).  
3.2.2 Caregiver Compliance Data. Our second data set tracked each of the 5,247 unique caregivers 
working in the 71 units at 42 hospitals using the electronic monitoring system who received a RFID 
badge prior to August 31, 2013. It included one observation per hand hygiene opportunity per caregiver 
COMPLIANCE AND MONITORING                                                 15 
including information about: (a) the date and time when a hand hygiene opportunity occurred, (b) whether 
or not the caregiver in question sanitized her hands, and (c) how many times the caregiver in question 
sanitized her hands during the 90-second compliance window associated with a hand hygiene opportunity. 
We used these data to examine how compliance changed in the long term after the activation of 
individual monitoring for all users (Hypothesis 3). Our sample consists of observations that occurred after 
the activation date of the corresponding unit (Nhand hygiene opportunities = 19,585,738). Prior to releasing these 
data, Proventix assigned anonymous identification numbers to caregivers and dispensers.  
3.3 Variables 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables. Total daily usage per unit bed. We first calculated the total number of times 
all dispensers in a given hospital unit were used on a given day, including usage generated by both 
badged users and unbadged users. We divided this number by the number of beds in a unit to obtain our 
dependent variable, total daily usage per unit bed, in order to adjust dispenser usage for unit size. Total 
daily usage per unit bed ranged from 0 to 579 with an average value of 48 and a standard deviation of 39. 
Compliance. We operationalized compliance with a dichotomous indicator variable recording 
whether a caregiver washed her hands during a given hand hygiene opportunity (either a patient room 
entry or exit). If a caregiver washed her hands, this indicator was set to one; otherwise, it was set to zero. 
The mean compliance rate in our hand hygiene compliance dataset was 45%, which is comparable to the 
39% compliance rate across hospitals reported by the World Health Organization (WHO 2009).  
3.3.2 Independent Variables. Activation. For each unit on each day, activation was coded using 
an indicator variable recording whether individual monitoring was active. Deactivation. For each unit on 
each day, the indicator variable deactivation was set equal to one if Proventix had reclaimed the RFID 
badges on or before the day in question from the hospital unit; otherwise, it equaled zero. For 62 hospital 
units that did not reclaim badges before their last observations in our data (including three units that 
discontinued individual monitoring during our study period but stopped tracking dispenser usage once 
badges were reclaimed), deactivation always equaled zero.  
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Months since activation: For each observation in our caregiver compliance data, we calculated the 
number of months elapsed since the focal hospital unit’s activation date up to the day in question.  
3.3.3. Moderator. Pre-activation usage. For each unit, we calculated the average value of its total daily 
usage per unit bed during the pre-activation period.  
3.3.4 Control Variables. To control for time trends we included a set of indicators for each month-year 
pair in our data. We also controlled for the day of the week when an observation occurred. Based on past 
research examining how work environments affect caregivers’ hand hygiene compliance (Dai et al. 2014), 
we included additional controls in our analysis of the caregiver compliance data; however, our results 
were robust if we did not control these variables. Specifically, we controlled for the length of the stay in a 
patient’s room associated with a given hand hygiene opportunity, an indicator for whether the hand 
hygiene opportunity in question involved a room entry (as opposed to a room exit), the hour of the day 
when the hand hygiene opportunity occurred, the time (in hours) elapsed since the start of a given 
caregiver’s shift leading up to a given hand hygiene opportunity, as well as the time (in hours) between 
the preceding shift and the current shift when a given hand hygiene opportunity occurred. In addition, past 
research indicates that individual behavior may change in the presence of others. The effect is unclear 
because others could provide either a distraction that lowers compliance or social pressure that 
encourages compliance (Mas and Moretti 2009; Chan, Li and Pierce 2014). For each room entry and 
room exit that occurred during the post-activation period, we were able to identify whether other 
caregivers were in the same patient room when the focal caregiver entered or exited the room. Thus, we 
controlled for the presence of other caregivers in regressions that predict individual compliance in the 
post-activation period.  
Finally, we included an indicator variable for each hospital unit in the unit-level analyses and 
each caregiver in the caregiver analyses. Thus, all analyses controlled for time-invariant aspects of 
hospital units (e.g., medical services provided) or individual caregivers (e.g., individual propensity to 
comply). These indicator variables had the effect of controlling for all between-unit or between-caregiver 
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variance such that our models explored within-unit or within-caregiver variance. Table 1 provides 
information on each control variable and Table 2 provides summary statistics for all variables. 
3.4 Empirical Analysis Strategy 
We relied on ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to analyze our data. Following Pierce et al. 
(2014), which examined an intervention that was rolled out at different times across multiple locations, 
we used a difference-in-differences design to test the effects of activating individual electronic monitoring 
on process compliance. Specifically, the activation of individual electronic monitoring was the treatment 
on each hospital unit. For a given unit that activated individual monitoring, other hospital units in the 
post-installation but pre-activation period served as the control group.3 The control groups, which had 
begun aggregate electronic monitoring, provided a counterfactual for how compliance would have 
changed in treatment units had they not activated individual electronic monitoring. For the unit-level 
analyses, our dependent variable was the total daily number of uses of all dispensers in a given hospital 
unit, i, on a given day, t, adjusted for the number of beds in the unit. The regression specification used to 
estimate the effects of activating monitoring on dispenser usage was: 
(1) 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦	𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡	𝑏𝑒𝑑12	= 𝛼4+ 𝛼5 ∗ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	12  +  𝜶 ∗ 𝑋12 +𝜆1 + 𝜖12  
where 𝑋12 represents the vector of the control variables described in Table 1, 𝜆1 represents an indicator for 
unit i, and 𝜖12 represents an error term. Hypothesis 1 predicted that 𝛼5 would be positive. To test 
Hypothesis 2, whether the individual monitoring effect was larger among units with higher pre-activation 
usage, we added the interaction between activation and (mean centered) pre-activation usage. Hypothesis 
2 predicted that the interaction term coefficient would be positive.  
To examine how compliance changed over time after individual monitoring activation, we 
included all caregivers in our analysis and relied on the following OLS regression: 
(2) 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒>2	= 𝛽4+ 𝛽	5 ∗ 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠	𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	>2  +                                             
                                                
3 Seven hospital units’ activation dates did not fall between the installation and activation dates of any other units. According to our design, those 
units did not have a control group. However, if we excluded those units from our analysis, our findings regarding the positive effect of activating 
monitoring on dispenser usage remained statistically significant (p < .0001) with virtually the same effect size as the effect size reported.  
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𝛽	A ∗ 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠	𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛>2A  + 𝜷 ∗ 𝑋>2 +𝜏> + 𝜀>2 
where 𝑋>2 represents the vector of the control variables described in Table 1, 𝜏> represents an indicator for 
caregiver j, and 𝜀12 again represents an error term. We mean-centered months since activation before we 
added a squared transformation of this variable to the regression model. Hypothesis 3 predicted that β1 
would be positive and β2 would be negative. Since this sample only included observations that occurred 
after the unit’s activation date, the indicator for activation was not included in this specification. 
Building on specification (1), we added an additional variable, deactivation, to examine how 
dispenser usage changed in response to the deactivation of individual monitoring: 
(3)                   𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦	𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡	𝑏𝑒𝑑12	= 𝛼4+ 𝛼5 ∗ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	12  + 𝛼A ∗ 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	12  + 𝜶 ∗ 𝑋12 +𝜆1 + 𝜖12, where 𝑋12 represents the vector of the control variables described in Table 1, 𝜆1 
represents an indicator for unit i, and 𝜖12 again represents an error term. Activation equaled one when 
individual monitoring was active, and zero for both the pre-activation period of all hospital units and the 
post-deactivation period for the units that terminated individual monitoring. Thus, deactivation captured 
the regression-estimated differences in total daily usage per unit bed between the pre-activation period 
and the post-deactivation period. Hypothesis 4 predicted that 𝛼A	would be negative. 
We clustered standard errors at the hospital unit level, as activation and termination of monitoring 
was implemented at individual hospital units. Our results were robust when we clustered standard errors 
at the hospital or caregiver level (in the caregiver compliance data).  
4. Results  
We first examine the effect of initiating individual monitoring before turning in Section 4.2 to the 
persistence of compliance over time and then to the termination of individual monitoring in Section 4.3.  
4.1 The Effects of Individual monitoring on Process Compliance 
4.1.1 Unit-Level Analysis. Each unit was observed from at least 27 days before the activation date (-27) 
to 17 days after the activation date (+17). We therefore begin our examination of the overall effects of 
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individual monitoring by evaluating the symmetric time window surrounding the activation date from 17 
days before the activation date (-17) to 17 days after the activation date (+17).  
Figure 2 displays the average daily dispenser usage per unit bed across all of the hospital units in 
our data set as a function of days since activation. Total daily usage per unit bed increased as soon as 
individual monitoring was activated. The average total daily usage per unit bed on the hospital unit’s date 
of activation and the 17 days following it was 54.97% higher (Mafter = 43.95, SD = 1.83; including the 
activation date) than the average total daily usage per unit bed in the 17 days preceding the hospital unit’s 
activation date (Mbefore = 28.36, SD = 1.66), a difference that is both meaningful and statistically 
significant (t(33) = 29.67, p < 0.0001). Thus, our results support Hypothesis 1 and do not show evidence 
of reactance in response to individual monitoring activation.  
We conducted regression analyses to determine whether this effect was robust to controlling for 
other variables expected to affect hand hygiene in healthcare. Table 3 presents the results of a series of 
OLS regressions predicting daily dispenser usage per unit bed by hospital unit. In Model 1, we tested 
regression specification (1) from above. This model includes all observations in our final, unit-level daily 
usage dataset with the exception of observations that occurred after individual monitoring was deactivated 
(if a given unit terminated individual monitoring during our study period). We observed a large and 
significant positive effect of activating individual monitoring on daily dispenser usage per unit bed (p < 
0.001). Compared with the regression-adjusted baseline total daily usage per unit bed of 36.64, activating 
individual monitoring increased daily dispenser usage by an estimated 44.61%, providing further support 
for Hypothesis 1 and highlighting the enormous benefits of individual monitoring on compliance.    
4.1.2 Badged vs. Unbadged Usage. As noted above, not all caregivers in a hospital received badges. 
Moreover, non-caregivers (such as patients and visitors) also may have used dispensers. In the pre-
activation period, we could not identify which dispenser uses came from caregivers who eventually 
received badges and were monitored at the individual level and which came from individuals who never 
received badges. As a result, the most appropriate analysis for testing Hypothesis 1 was to compare 
dispenser usage by all users before and after the activation of individual electronic monitoring, as 
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conducted above. This left open the question, however, of how monitoring affected badged versus 
unbadged users. To begin exploring this question, we examined how dispenser usage by people not 
wearing a badge (i.e., unbadged usage) changed pre- versus post-activation. If monitoring only influenced 
badged users’ compliance behaviors, then unbadged usage would be expected to decline dramatically on 
the monitoring activation date. This is because Proventix converted a substantial portion of previously 
unbadged users to badged users upon activating its monitoring system, leaving a smaller number of 
people as unbadged users who continued to contribute to unbadged usage. To quantify how much 
unbadged usage should have decreased when monitoring activation shifted some caregivers were badged, 
we first estimated that the percentage of caregivers who became badged users ranged from 6% to 73% 
across 71 hospital units with the mean being 27%. Based on these estimates, for each hospital unit, we 
further estimated how much of total daily dispenser usage in the 17 days prior to monitoring activation 
came from caregivers who eventually were badged. This step led to our estimate that the decrease in 
unbadged usage ranged from 0.26 to 41.47 uses per unit bed per day across 71 hospital units (with the 
mean being 8.67). Figure 2 depicts the actual and counterfactual average daily unbadged usage 17 days 
before and 17 days after monitoring activation. Interestingly, unbadged usage did not drop precipitously 
right after the activation of individual monitoring. Further,  we predicted unbadged usage using an OLS 
regression model similar to specification (1), and confirmed that unbadged usage did not significantly 
differ between the pre-activation and post-activation periods (β = -0.68, p = 0.48). This is surprising, 
suggesting that unbadged users also increased dispenser usage after electronic monitoring activation.  
 To make sure that unusual patient or visitor use of dispensers is not driving the effect of 
monitoring documented in Sections 4.1.1, we created a dataset that isolated time periods when visitors 
were unlikely to be in rooms and patients were less likely than usual to be washing their hands: the six 
hour window between midnight and 6am.4 We assumed that dispenser use during this 12am-6am time 
window came mostly from caregivers (with or without a badge). As Table 4 shows, we found that total 
                                                
4 The results in Table 4 have the same pattern when we (a) use 9pm-6am to proxy for visitor-free hours, (b) examine all observations in the pre-
activation and post-activation periods, or (c) estimate changes in total usage during visitor-free hours using regression specification (1).  
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usage during this time period increased, on average, by 68.9% in the 18-day period after monitoring was 
activated (including the activation date), compared with the 17-day period prior to monitoring activation. 
The size of this increase is similar to that observed in the full dataset during the same 17 day window 
before and after the activation date (i.e., a 62.2% increase, as explained in Section 4.1.1). In addition, after 
individual monitoring was activated, unbadged usage during the visitor-free window from 12am-6am 
(which we assume was generated primarily by caregivers without a badge) accounted for 49.3% of total 
usage; this usage breakdown is similar to what we observed during the entire day: 51.0% of usage was by 
unbadged users and 49% was by badged users. This likely indicates that after individual monitoring 
activation, a significant portion of unbadged use within a day in our data is from caregivers without a 
badge, as opposed to visitors and patients. We cannot be certain, but we have every reason to believe that 
visitors and patients account for a small proportion of dispenser usage before monitoring activation too. 
 In an additional analysis designed to gain traction on the extent to which our findings on total 
usage are driven by badged versus unbadged users, we classified the 71 hospital units into three groups 
based on the percentage of their total daily dispenser usage that was attributable to badged users in the 18 
days following their activation date (including the activation date). For hospital units in each category, we 
calculated the change in total daily usage per bed between the 17 days prior to and the 18 days after a 
unit’s activation date. We found that the 24 hospital units with the highest composition of badged usage 
experienced a larger increase in total daily usage per bed (112.0%) than the 24 units with mid-level 
composition of badged usage (47.5%) or the 23 units with the lowest composition of badged usage 
(24.3%).5 This analysis shows that hospitals with higher badged usage experienced greater increases in 
compliance behavior than hospitals with lower badged usage. This result suggests that badged users, 
rather than unbadged users, have primarily driven the effects of electronic monitoring on dispenser usage. 
Finally, we examine one subset of caregivers for whom we had data both before and after the 
activation of individual electronic monitoring – pilot testers. Across 71 hospital units, 195 of the 5,247 
                                                
5 We see the same patterns when we (a) examine all observations in the pre-activation and post-activation periods or (b) estimate changes using 
regression specification (1). These additional analyses are available from the authors upon request. 
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caregivers (who experienced a total of 1,159,338 hand hygiene opportunities) were designated as pilot 
testers, received an active RFID badge, and were instructed to wear their badge at work during the pre-
activation period of their corresponding unit. These caregivers were informed that as pilot testers their 
hand hygiene compliance rates would be tracked by Proventix but not by their managers. Since pilot 
testers were tracked both before and after the activation of individual monitoring, we are able to identify a 
precise effect of activating individual monitoring on their compliance rates. Such an analysis is not 
subject to the same limitation surrounding badged versus unbadged use as our unit-level analysis above. 
Using an OLS regression model similar to specification (2) described in Section 3.4, we predicted 
the dependent variable, compliance, indicating whether a pilot tester washed her hands at a given hand 
hygiene opportunity. We removed months since activation from regression specification (2) and added the 
indicator variable activation as our key predictor variable.6 The positive and significant coefficient on 
activation shows that pilot testers’ hand hygiene compliance rates significantly increased following the 
activation of individual monitoring (β = 0.11; p < 0.01), supporting Hypothesis 1 (Appendix D provides 
more detail). Compared with the regression-adjusted baseline compliance rates among these pilot testers 
of 43.95%, compliance rates in the post-activation period increased to a rate of 54.56%, representing an 
improvement of 24.14%. Note that pilot testers were wearing badges that tracked their compliance and 
reported it to Proventix (just not their managers) prior to activation, so they likely already felt monitored 
individually prior to activation. Thus, this analysis is a conservative test of Hypothesis 1. We also note 
that pilot testers were not randomly selected. That said, we believe that this finding, combined with the 
unit-level results above, provide valuable support for our first hypothesis.  
. All in all, unbadged usage does not appear to be driving our observed effect. However, it is 
interesting that even though they are not monitored, unbadged users increase their use with individual 
electronic monitoring deployment. Unbadged caregivers, patients and visitors may have increased their 
dispenser usage as they observed that badged caregivers who were being monitored increased their hand 
                                                
6 We retained the same control variables in specification (2) except the indicator for other caregivers’ presence at a hand hygiene opportunity 
because we did not have information about other caregivers’ presence prior to individual monitoring activation.  
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hygiene activity. In addition, unbadged caregivers may have felt organizational pressure to comply once 
they knew that badged caregivers were being watched. As noted in a client prepared report shared with 
the researchers, “Increases in HH [hand hygiene] activity by non-monitored individuals suggest that the 
ability to influence HH behavior extended beyond the directly monitored healthcare workers.” 
4.1.3 Pre-Activation Usage. To test Hypothesis 2 we first noted that, as expected, there is substantial 
variation in the effect size of activation on usage across units. Overall there is a clear, positive average 
effect of activation, consistent with Hypothesis 1. Notably, 55 out of 71 hospital units (i.e., 77.46% of our 
sample) showed a boost in usage after initiating electronic monitoring, with the effect being statistically 
significant at the 5% level for 44 individual hospitals units (i.e., 61.97% of all observed units). However, 
in the unit where monitoring was least effective, activating individual monitoring actually decreased daily 
dispenser usage significantly by 39.32 uses per unit bed per day (75.62% of this unit’s regression-adjusted 
baseline); in the unit where monitoring was most effective, it increased daily dispenser usage significantly 
by 92.23 uses per unit bed per day (180.88% of this unit’s regression-adjusted baseline). A Wald test 
indicated that the differences in the estimated effects of individual monitoring across 71 hospital units 
were significantly larger than would be expected by chance (F(38, 70) = 3.9x108, p < 0.0001). This means 
that the differences between hospital units were not simply due to random noise but were substantive.  
Turning to the effect of pre-activation usage on adoption, we examined Model 2 of Table 3 where 
we added an interaction between activation and (mean centered) pre-activation usage to our regression 
model to predict total daily usage per unit bed. We note that mean reversion would predict that units with 
higher pre-activation usage should show a smaller activation effect, in contrast to our Hypothesis 2, which 
predicted just the opposite of this. The significant and positive interaction effect shown in Model 2 of 
Table 3 suggests that usage improved more as a result of monitoring in hospital units with higher pre-
activation dispenser usage than in hospital units with lower pre-activation dispenser usage (p = 0.02). 
Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in pre-activation dispenser usage (i.e., an increase of 15 
uses per unit bed per day) is associated with a 7.34 use per unit bed per day increase in the positive effect 
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of individual monitoring on total daily usage (i.e., 21.58% boost in regression-adjusted baseline total 
daily usage). This result supports Hypothesis 2. 
4.2 The Long-term Effects of Individual Monitoring on Compliance  
 So far we have demonstrated that when hospital units initiated electronic monitoring, process 
compliance increased significantly and this effect was stronger in units with more badged users and more 
pre-activation usage. We next turned to an investigation of how persistent these effects are over time. We 
first examined whether compliance shows an inverted U-shaped relationship over time, declining in 
efficacy after the initial boost when caregivers first learned they were being monitored (H3). 
We used data on caregivers’ compliance (rather than data tracking overall dispenser usage) for 
these analyses in order to examine how individuals responded to monitoring over the long-term. We used 
regression specification (2), described above, to explore this pattern rigorously. Model 3 in Table 3 
showed a significant and positive coefficient on months since activation (p = 0.01) and a significant and 
negative coefficient on its squared term (p = 0.02). This indicates that caregivers’ hand hygiene 
compliance increased at first, post-activation, before subsequently decreasing. To confirm that there was 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between months since activation and compliance, we conducted further 
analyses (Kesavan, Staats and Gilland 2014; Tan and Netessine 2014). First, we determined that the 
stationary point occurred 21.6 months after the activation of monitoring, which was well within the 
observation period. The 95% confidence interval surrounding the stationary point calculated based on the 
delta method, [12.5 months, 30.7 months], was also within the observation period (Muggeo 2003). 
Second, following Lind and Mehlum (2010), we confirmed that the slope of the curve was positive and 
significant at the minimum point of months-since-activation (p = 0.003), and the slope was negative and 
significant at p = 0.05 at the maximum value. Further, following Nelson and Simonsohn (2014), we ran 
two separate regression models using (a) observations that occurred before the stationary point (i.e., 21.6 
months) and (b) observations that occurred after the stationary point. We found that compliance increased 
significantly over time before months since activation reached the stationary point (𝛽 = 0.006, p < 
0.0001), whereas compliance decreased significantly over time after months since activation reached the 
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stationary point (𝛽 = -0.016, p = 0.002). Finally, instead of imposing a curvilinear relationship between 
compliance and months since activation by regressing compliance on the linear and quadratic terms of 
months since activation, we tested Hypothesis 2 using a more flexible specification. In a regression model 
similar to Model 3 in Table 3, we replaced the continuous measure of months since activation with 39 
indicator variables for each of the months in the post-activation period for each hospital unit, and we 
treated the month of activation as the omitted, reference group. Based on the results of this regression 
model, we then calculated the fitted hand hygiene compliance for each month in the post-activation 
period. As shown in Figure 3, this analysis clearly reveals that fitted compliance increased first and then 
gradually decreased over time. The 20th month following the activation of electronic monitoring had the 
highest fitted compliance, which was significantly higher than both compliance in the month of activation 
and compliance in the last month during our observation period (both p-values < 0.05). These analyses 
based on a flexible regression specification produced the same conclusions as our curvilinear model and 
confirmed the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship, supporting Hypothesis 3. 
4.3 The Effect of Terminating Individual Monitoring  
Finally, we turn to our termination hypothesis (H4), which predicted that compliance would 
decrease below the baseline pre-activation level when monitoring was discontinued. To investigate this, 
we first analyzed data on nine hospital units at six hospitals that terminated their monitoring program in 
the middle of 2013 (Nobservations = 4,520). We compared post-deactivation dispenser usage to pre-activation 
dispenser usage using all observations prior to activation and all observations following deactivation 
among the nine units that deactivated individual monitoring. Doing so revealed that average, post-
deactivation daily usage per bed (M = 28.40, SD = 27.93) was lower than the average, pre-activation daily 
usage per bed (M = 35.23, SD = 17.26, t(933) = 4.40, p < 0.0001), supporting H4. In fact, the average 
post-deactivation daily usage per unit bed was lower than the average pre-activation daily usage in eight 
out of nine units, with the decrease being statistically significant at the 5% level in six units.  
As an additional test of Hypothesis 4 we used a regression model. Model 4 in Table 3 relies on 
regression specification (3), described previously, and included all observations from all of the units in 
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our data. We included two primary predictor variables: activation and deactivation, to simultaneously 
identify the effects of activating and deactivating individual monitoring. Consistent with previous support 
presented for Hypothesis 1 in Section 4.1.1, a positive and significant coefficient on activation indicated 
that total daily usage per unit bed increased following the activation of individual monitoring (p < 0.001).  
We next turned to deactivation to examine the differences between post-deactivation dispenser usage and 
pre-activation usage. In support of Hypothesis 4, the negative and significant coefficient (p < 0.001) on 
deactivation suggested that dispenser usage on average dropped below the pre-activation usage level 
following the removal of individual electronic monitoring. Specifically, compared with the regression-
adjusted daily dispenser usage per unit bed in the pre-activation period (36.63), terminating individual 
electronic monitoring decreased daily dispenser usage per unit bed by 46.60% to 19.56.  
4.4 Endogeneity of Monitoring Adoption and Termination 
 We conducted additional analyses to explore whether the timing of activating individual 
monitoring is correlated with key hospital characteristics. Specifically, we split the 71 hospital units into 
two groups based on when they adopted individual monitoring. The 36 hospital units with earlier 
adoption dates and the 35 hospital units with later adoption dates did not significantly differ in (i) the 
number of beds in a unit, (ii) average monthly inpatient admissions, and (iii) pre-activation daily usage 
(all p-values > 0.18).7 We also split the 42 hospitals based on when they adopted individual monitoring 
and confirmed that the 21 hospitals with earlier activation dates did not differ from the 21 hospitals with 
later activation dates along any of the observables that Proventix provided to us and collected from the 
American Hospital Directory database (e.g., total inpatient discharges; all p-values > 0.30).  
To address the concern that dispenser usage was already increasing before individual monitoring 
was activated, we analyzed pre- and post-activation time trends in dispenser usage, following past 
research (Autor 2003). Specifically, we created two “lead” indicator variables to indicate 0-30 days before 
                                                
7 We examined whether the monitoring effect was different between early and late activating hospital units. To estimate the monitoring effect size 
for every unit, we used regression specification (1) from Section 3.4 where the dependent variable is total daily usage per bed. We replaced the 
activation indicator with indicators for the post-activation period for each of the 71 units. We found that the activation effect was on average 
larger for the 35 hospital units that activated monitoring later, as compared to the 36 hospital units that activated monitoring earlier (p = 0.002). In 
particular, this effect is driven by the 17 units that activated in 2013, as compared to the 54 units that activated before 2013.  We find no 
significant difference in activation effect between units that activated in 2010 vs. 2011 vs. 2012 (p-values for pairwise comparisons > 0.41).  
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activation and 30-60 days before activation, respectively. We also created 11 “lag” indicator variables to 
capture 0-30 days, 30-60 days, 60-90 days, up to 270-300 days after activation and beyond 300 days after 
activation, respectively. In a model similar to Model 1 from Table 3, we replaced our key predictor 
variable, activation, with these aforementioned indicator variables for the 30-day periods before (lead) 
and after (lag) activation. In this model, the reference group was the period of time preceding activation 
by more than 60 days. The coefficients on the two “lead” indicator variables were not statistically 
significant, suggesting there was no significant anticipatory response to activation among hospital units 
that were about to activate individual monitoring. See Appendix E for more details.  
We also explored whether individual monitoring termination was correlated with key hospital 
characteristics. We found that the nine units that discontinued monitoring did not significantly differ from 
the remaining 62 units on observable dimensions: (i) unit beds, (ii) average monthly inpatient admissions, 
and (iii) pre-activation daily usage (all p-values > 0.11). Also, these two unit types were comparable in 
terms of the average size of the effect of activating monitoring on dispenser usage (p-value > 0.67). 
4.5 Additional Robustness Checks 
The regression results presented in Table 3 remained meaningfully unchanged in terms of magnitude and 
significance when we performed the robustness checks discussed in the results section. In addition, we 
performed checks detailed below. All reported results are available from the authors upon request.   
First, we find that for the dispenser usage data described in Section 3.2.1, our findings were 
unchanged when we removed cases where total daily usage per unit bed was at least three standard 
deviations above the mean (n = 542) or when we log-transformed total daily usage per unit bed to address 
the concern that the variable was right-skewed. Further, for the caregiver compliance data described in 
Section 3.2.2, we obtained the same basic results with a daily-level model where the dependent variable 
was the average compliance rate of a given caregiver on a given day, instead of the hand hygiene 
opportunity model reported here. Also, our results remained unchanged if we excluded control variables 
in Table 1 that were only used for analyzing caregiver data (e.g., hours at work, hours off work, etc.).  
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Second, an additional concern pertains to potential problems with the standard errors in our 
difference-in-difference models. Bertrand et al., (2004) suggest that because of serial correlation, these 
models may underestimate the standard errors of the estimated treatment effects and so following 
Bertrand et al., (2004), we addressed the serial correlation problem by clustering standard errors at the 
hospital unit level in all of our models (Table 3). Further, we implemented placebo tests to demonstrate 
that the estimated effects of activating monitoring were not spuriously driven by our data structure (Pierce 
et al., 2014). Specifically, for each hospital unit, we randomly assigned an activation date by selecting a 
day that fell between the unit’s activation date and its last day in our data (or its deactivation date if this 
unit terminated monitoring). Then we ran Model 1 in Table 3 by replacing actual activation dates with 
placebo activation dates. We repeated this placebo test 100 times. Appendix F presents the estimated 
effects of activating monitoring, together with the 95% confidence intervals, for each placebo test and the 
actual data (i.e., Model 1 in Table 3). Only three out of 100 placebo models produced positive coefficients 
significant at the 5% level, and all estimates were smaller than the true data’s estimates.  
Finally, a concern is whether monitoring termination signaled a decrease in patient volume that 
could have led to a reduction in dispenser usage, supporting Hypothesis 4. As a reminder, most units 
terminated because a grant expired. The importance of hand hygiene compliance, as captured by funding 
and accreditation body recommendations, did not materially change during this time. As a check, using 
information on monthly admissions in eight hospital units that terminated monitoring, we confirmed that 
average monthly admissions after activation did not decrease leading up to badge reclamation. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our empirical results demonstrated large and significant initial benefits from individual electronic 
monitoring on process compliance. First, we found that, on average, a large and significant increase in 
hand hygiene compliance ensued after the introduction of individual electronic monitoring. However, 
there was significant variability in the treatment effect across organizations. Second, we found that units 
with higher pre-activation hand hygiene compliance had a larger treatment effect than units with lower 
pre-activation hand hygiene compliance. Third, utilizing individual-level data, we found that the effect of 
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monitoring was persistent over time; however, the effect did eventually begin to degrade approximately 
two years after rollout. Although this initial increase in process compliance is consistent with a habit 
formation model, eventually compliance declined, which seems more consistent with a desensitization 
perspective. Within the 1,214-day follow-up period we studied, these declines were not sufficient to 
produce compliance levels below those observed prior to the electronic monitoring intervention; however, 
it is possible that a longer panel of data could reveal such a reversal. Based on our regression results, we 
extrapolated the compliance rates for the period beyond our observation period. We estimated that, if 
everything else remained the same, the average compliance rates approximately 43 months after 
activation would be the same as the compliance rates on the activation date. Further, it would take about 
ten years post-activation for the average compliance rates to drop significantly below compliance rates at 
the time of activation if the decline we detected continued unabated. Finally, we investigated termination 
effects within our sample and found that not only did levels of use decline when individual electronic 
monitoring was removed, but that strikingly, they declined below pre-activation levels.  
Our findings make a number of contributions to academic theory. Achieving process compliance 
has been a foundational challenge in operations for over a century. Although Taylor noted as early as 
1911 that managers needed to enforce process compliance, studies from the early 20th century (Mayo 
1933) through the modern era (Bernstein 2012) indicate that process compliance often does not occur. In 
some cases, it may be appropriate to ignore standardized processes if they are poorly designed. However, 
many standardized processes yield better, faster, and safer outputs. This is particularly true with hand 
hygiene where the medical literature has convincingly showed the positive safety implications of 
compliance by caregivers with hand hygiene recommendations (WHO 2009; Boyce 2011).  
The first contribution of this work is to demonstrate that individual electronic monitoring can 
have a large and significant positive effect on process compliance. We identified this effect across a 
substantial number of organizations using archival data. Providing such a finding across multiple 
organizations is an important contribution, since prior work notes that the limited research on the topic 
has considered only one or two units, typically, and that not all units exhibit a positive effect (Boyce 
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2011; Ward et al. 2014). Studying the deployment of the same system across multiple organizations also 
provides four additional benefits. First, it provides a constant measure of compliance to evaluate across 
organizations, as opposed to prior studies that measured compliance differently from each other (Srigley 
et al. 2015). Second, it allows us to eliminate concerns about correlated, external events (e.g., a CDC 
report emphasizing the importance of hand hygiene) that could be driving the effect. The organizations 
included in our study deployed electronic monitoring at different times during our three-and-a-half-year 
observation period. This diversity in timing aids in controlling for any concurrent events that might bias a 
typical one-off event study. The prevalent benefits of electronic monitoring observed in our study further 
suggest that our findings are unlikely to be explained by external, concurrent events. Third, studying 
multiple organizations enables us to overcome publication bias where a positive effect in a single 
organization is more likely to be submitted and published in the literature.  
Documenting the significant variability that exists in the activation effect is the paper’s second 
contribution. It not only responds to a call for exploration of heterogeneous treatment effects in healthcare 
(Boyce 2011), but also provides value to operations management by highlighting the substantial variance 
that can exist across organizations. With the heterogeneity identified, it becomes possible to explain why 
such differences exist. This leads to our third contribution: an exploration of the effect of pre-activation 
compliance on the adoption of individual electronic monitoring. Prior work highlights that organizational 
members’ actions are affected by the organization’s norms, organizational design, and management 
attention. We further demonstrate that those organizational factors can help explain the significant 
variation we observe in the effects of electronic monitoring on compliance behavior. In line with the 
results about monitoring termination that we subsequently report, this finding highlights that individual 
electronic monitoring is not a panacea, by itself. Organizations looking to build process compliance must 
think about how electronic monitoring fits within a broader system encompassing not only technology, 
but also norms, culture, and leadership, among other things.   
Our fourth contribution is to shed light on the impact of individual electronic monitoring on 
compliance over time. We evaluated whether the positive initial effect of monitoring increased or 
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gradually decayed as time since the initial rollout passed. On one hand, if the initial introduction of 
monitoring creates a lasting change in employees’ beliefs about the importance of monitoring or 
perceptions of management’s commitment or enforcement of hand hygiene, we expect that the increase in 
compliance following monitoring should be sustained. Further, research on habituation (Wood and Neal 
2007; Neal et al. 2012) suggests that the constant presence of electronic monitoring may help people 
eventually build hand hygiene habits whereby hand hygiene compliance becomes unconsciously 
integrated into their behavioral routines, leading to either constant or perhaps increasing process 
compliance over time. On the other hand, another stream of research suggests that interventions may 
slowly lose their effectiveness with the passage of time as they grow less salient (Thompson and Spencer 
1966; Nahrgang, Morgeson and Hofmann 2011; Haselhuhn et al. 2012). This would predict a decline in 
process compliance over time. Our results showed that neither prediction alone is entirely accurate. 
Rather, we found that at first, compliance increased, albeit at a decreasing rate, and eventually it declined. 
Practically speaking, the good news is that we do not see compliance decline until almost two years after 
monitoring is deployed. Interestingly single and dual organization studies in the healthcare literature have 
identified the initial increasing portion of this relationship (Armellino et al. 2011; Walker et al. 2014), but 
not the eventual decreasing returns. Our results not only provide multiple organizations to explore the 
effect, but given our longer, longitudinal panel we are able to observe compliance begin to decrease.  
This paper’s fifth contribution, which is its most surprising one, comes from its examination of 
the implications of terminating electronic monitoring. Prior theory is unclear as to what impact 
monitoring termination will have, and we address this uncertainty with our analysis. We found that levels 
of compliance decreased significantly after electronic monitoring was terminated. Not only that, but 
remarkably, we found that levels of compliance decreased below the initial level of compliance observed 
before the original deployment of electronic monitoring. These findings suggest that electronic 
monitoring did not produce a habit that was sufficiently strong to withstand its removal. Our results are 
also consistent with a crowding out hypothesis whereby individuals who were previously complying due 
to internal motivation may have shifted their motivation to an external focus. When this external stimulus 
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was removed, the behavior declined. More work is needed to understand why process compliance 
decreased on average after the termination of monitoring, but the observation that removal of monitoring 
technology can leave compliance worse than it was before installation is an important, cautionary lesson.   
The final contribution of this work is methodological. A continual challenge for researchers has 
been how to study behavioral responses to changes within organizations as the mere act of observing a 
behavior can change that behavior (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1934). Webb et al. (1966) suggested that 
researchers use trace data to track the actions of individuals without biasing their behavior. In 1966 this 
meant doing things such as measuring carpet wear to estimate traffic patterns. New technologies present 
novel sources of digital trace data. By using RFID badge data we introduce the small, but growing body 
of sociometric badge research to the operations field. Not only can RFID badges be used to study this 
paper’s questions, but they offer the potential to answer many process questions. For example, RFID tags 
may make it possible to observe stockouts in inventory research. Time and motion studies may include 
precise data on where and when actions occurred. For example, in healthcare, a researcher could examine 
if time spent by caregivers in patient rooms predicts a decrease in length of stay or adverse outcomes. 
These studies will require partnerships between academia and industry, and they will offer an exciting, 
new glimpse into the behavioral drivers of operational efficiency and effectiveness. 
5.1 Hospital Intervention Efforts 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, Proventix management identified the presence and timing of 
management interventions. While acknowledging that the intervention count is small (Performance 
Feedback = 48 units; Goal Setting = 36; Leadership = 19; Competition = 8; Incentive = 25) and their 
introduction is endogenous, it is useful to examine their impact on process compliance to spur future 
research. It is rare to find a setting with data on such diverse interventions. Thus, we repeated Table 3’s 
models with the addition of indicators for each of the five interventions types. The indicators equaled one 
when an intervention was introduced in a unit and thereafter and otherwise were equal to zero. We only 
included units for which we had intervention data, and we reported the regression results in Table 5.  
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 First, we confirmed that all of our hypotheses were statistically significantly supported, as before. 
Next, to estimate the effects of the interventions, we focused on Model 3, as this model captured 
individual compliance rates over time. We found that indicators for the five types of interventions were 
jointly significant (p < .0001). The coefficients on goal setting (p = 0.76), incentives (p = 0.07), and 
performance feedback (p=0.65) were not statistically significant at conventional levels. The indicators for 
the leadership and competition interventions were, however, statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Specifically, in the cases where leadership learned about the initiative and showed commitment, 
compliance rates were on average 13 percentage points higher; in the cases where caregivers were divided 
into groups that were placed in competition to reach the highest compliance, compliance rates were, on 
average, 6 percentage points higher. Of course, leaders’ demonstration of commitment and the 
introduction of team competition can occur contemporaneously with other changes in management 
practices (e.g., using monitoring for learning purposes, rather than just punishment). Nevertheless, these 
results highlight the importance of leadership commitment to change initiatives and the motivating effects 
of competition. Ideally, future work would include random assignment of interventions to understand the 
relative magnitudes of the benefits produced by these interventions and their interactive effects. 
5.2 Limitations 
It is important to note that our study had several significant limitations. First, we are unable to 
identify the effects of individual electronic monitoring on caregivers per se but can only estimate the 
overall effects of monitoring on all users of hand hygiene dispensers in hospitals. Though our analysis of 
pilot testers sheds some light on the effects of monitoring on individual caregivers, it would be valuable 
for future research to precisely calibrate the magnitude of the monitoring effect among average 
caregivers.   Such a calibration would be tremendously useful for making more precise policy 
recommendations.  Second, we were unable to precisely track all hand-hygiene-related interventions that 
were implemented in our sample during the study period. As described in Section 5.1, we replicate our 
results when we control for known management interventions that were layered on top of electronic 
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monitoring. However, to cleanly isolate the effect of monitoring in the field over an extended period time, 
future research would need to create a far more controlled work environment than our setting provided.  
A third limitation pertains to the generalizability of our findings to the broader population of 
hospitals. Comparing the hospitals in our sample to the broader population, we find that our sample is 
slightly larger and slightly more urban than average, but the case mix index is comparable. Although we 
would theoretically expect to find similar effects of activating individual electronic monitoring across the 
population of hospitals, additional work with still larger samples and random assignment of monitoring 
would be valuable. In a similar vein, our investigation of the effect of terminating individual monitoring 
relies on a small subset of the hospital units in our overall sample. Though as detailed in Section 4.4, the 
hospital units that terminated monitoring were similar to other hospital units in our sample on important 
dimensions, we need to be cautious about generalizing our findings to a broad population of hospitals.   
A fourth potential limitation of our work is that the monitoring technology we study requires 
caregivers to wear their badges for compliance to be tracked.  It could be that caregivers only wore their 
badges when they planned to be compliant and removed them during periods of non-compliance.  In 
analyses of total hand hygiene dispenser usage, this is not a concern because it would not alter caregivers’ 
observability. We also do not think such “strategic behaviors” are likely to explain the long-term trend in 
caregivers’ compliance that we observed either because when we controlled for the number of daily hand 
hygiene opportunities in Model 3 of Table 3, our findings remained virtually unchanged.  Still, our 
inability to monitor badged caregivers if they elected to remove their badges is a limitation. 
Further, we do not have direct evidence to explain why process compliance, on average, 
decreased below the pre-activation usage level after the termination of electronic monitoring. There is a 
concern that a post-termination decrease in the behavior could be the result of a response to a change in 
the estimated importance of that behavior. However, in the case of hand hygiene, the expectation from 
accreditation bodies, patients, and payers remained that hospitals should have high compliance. 
Termination of electronic monitoring was unlikely driven by an external or clinical decline in hand 
hygiene emphasis. That said, it is possible that management –implicitly or explicitly – did not place as 
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high of a value on hand hygiene post-termination, as illustrated by their decision not to deploy financial 
resources towards continued electronic monitoring of hand hygiene. Finally, although our study analyzes 
data across many hospitals, it looks at only one practice (hand hygiene) in one industry. Future work 
should extend this research to explore other industries and other compliance behaviors. 
5.3 Directions for Future Research 
There are a number of ways that future research could and should follow-up on our work. First, 
there is an opportunity to further explore the boundary conditions that influence the efficacy of electronic 
monitoring. As discussed earlier, the intrusiveness of monitoring and its consistency with employees’ 
goals may impact the effect of monitoring. In our setting, monitoring is minimally intrusive and few 
caregivers are likely to object to the goal of hand hygiene compliance, at least publicly. Future work 
would ideally examine settings where not only are these factors are different, but where there is within-
study variation on these dimensions. Second, there is an opportunity to investigate additional moderators 
of the effect of monitoring on compliance and termination. For example, work on operational 
transparency shows that there are benefits to consumers and workers that accrue from revealing these 
groups’ actions to one other (Buell and Norton 2011; Buell, Kim and Tsay 2014). Transparency creates 
monitoring, by a customer instead of a manager, and so creates opportunities for extending research on 
monitoring. Seeing how operational transparency – as well as other factors – influence the effects of 
electronic monitoring on process compliance would be fruitful areas for future study.  
In our setting, individuals were also able to receive personalized feedback on their compliance 
levels by looking at the display screen on a given dispenser. Although we cannot fully disentangle the 
individual feedback and monitoring effects, our robustness checks with pilot testers help address this 
concern. Pilot testers were able to receive personalized feedback during the pre-activation period but were 
told that their compliance was not being monitored by management. Although one can question if they 
completely believed this instruction, we still observed a significant, 19% increase in compliance among 
these pilot testers following the full rollout of individual electronic monitoring. This provides strong 
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evidence that electronic monitoring itself and not merely personalized feedback on compliance, 
meaningfully improves process compliance. However, future work on this topic would be valuable.  
Finally, topics such as habit formation have been studied traditionally in the laboratory (Wood 
and Neal 2007). New work is beginning to unpack these effects over time in the field (Allcott and Rogers 
2014; Pierce et al. 2014; Milkman et al. 2014). Examining repeated behaviors in their native context 
allows researchers to study them over longer periods of time than is practical in the lab, and to understand 
the underlying causal dynamics that drive changes through the use of detailed archival data and field 
experiments. For example, individuals’ likelihood of complying with standard processes is not only a 
function of their choices and organizational environment (e.g., the deployment of electronic monitoring), 
but also the compliance activities of others around them (c.f., Huckman, Staats and Upton 2009; Chan et 
al. 2014). Future work could examine how persistence changes based on the actions of co-workers.  
For example, in our regression specification (2) for individual compliance rates we included a 
control variable for the presence of another caregiver in the room. Examining the variable presence in 
Model 3 of Table 3 we find the coefficient is negative (𝛽 = -0.04) and statistically significant (p < .0001). 
This suggests that caregivers wash their hands less frequently both at room entries and room exits if their 
coworkers are in the same patient room. Future work should unpack this result further, but there are at 
least three possible reasons why this might be the case. First, having others in the room may prove 
distracting as opposed to creating social pressure to comply. It is uncommon for coworkers to be co-
present in the same room (10% of the time), thus it is plausible that caregivers are distracted by the 
presence of coworkers and forget to wash their hands. It is also plausible that the presence of coworkers 
leads caregivers to focus on doing a good job at their primary tasks (e.g., handling an emergency) and 
shifts their attention away from secondary tasks (e.g., hand hygiene). Finally, cases where caregivers 
enter and/or exit a patient room with coworkers in the same location might be cases where caregivers 
perform a multi-person task together with their coworkers (e.g., restraining a patient, pulling a patient up 
in the bed). Caregivers might consider it clinically less important to wash their hands if they just come 
into the room to lend a hand to coworkers, although the fact that they have touched something in the room 
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means that they still should wash their hands. Building on work that has examined peer effects (Mas and 
Moretti 2009; Chan et al. 2014), future research should delve deeper to understand this effect. 
5.4 Conclusion 
 Altogether our paper has important implications for managers and scholars. We found that 
electronic monitoring is one tool that managers can use to dramatically improve standardized process 
compliance. Given the low compliance rates observed in many contexts (e.g., checklists, standardized 
work, use of safety gear), this is encouraging news. However, we also found that managers cannot simply 
“monitor and forget.” Rather, the observed drop-off in compliance after a lengthy period of monitoring 
suggests that there is a need for ongoing managerial interventions to sustain the benefits of monitoring. 
Finally, our finding that after monitoring is terminated, compliance falls below its original, natural levels 
offers a cautionary note for managers. Deploying electronic monitoring without a long-term plan for 
supporting its retention may be short-sighted as it could end up actually harming process compliance. 
 Our paper also contributes to operations management literature. Significant attention is focused 
on creating standard practices to improve operational performance. However, without adoption and 
compliance, the benefits from such standardized practices cannot be realized. By studying electronic 
monitoring we examined one important way that the use of standardized practices can be encouraged. By 
shedding light on the effects of adoption, persistence, and termination, we not only gain insight into how 
to encourage process compliance, but we also learn how better to design operating systems.   
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1.    Description of control variables included in our primary regression analyses. 
Name Description 
Month Indicator To control for time trends, we constructed indicator variables for each month-
year pair in our data. For the correlation tables (Table 2), we created a 
continuous variable, months since start, to indicate the distance in months 
between the first month of our data and a given observation. 
Day of the Week 
 
To control for the previous observation that workers wash their hands less 
frequently during the week than on weekends (WHO, 2009), we constructed 
indicator variables for each day of the week (Tuesday through Sunday; Monday 
is the omitted indicator in our analyses).  
Control Variables Listed Below Were Only Included in Our Analyses of Caregiver-Level Compliance  
Hours at Work Prior research shows that hand hygiene compliance rates decrease over the 
course of a single caregiver shift (Dai et al., 2014). Thus, we created a variable 
to indicate the number of hours elapsed since the start of a caregiver’s shift. 
Hours off Work Past research has shown that the longer a caregiver’s break between consecutive 
work shifts, the higher her compliance will be during her subsequent shift (Dai et 
al., 2014). Thus, we created a variable to capture the number of hours between a 
given caregiver’s shift and her preceding shift.  
Duration of a Patient 
Room Stay (in 
hours) 
Prior research suggests that caregivers’ duration of contact with patients matters: 
caregivers who are in contact with patients for more than two minutes are more 
likely to wash their hands than caregivers who are in contact with patients for 
less than two minutes (WHO, 2009). Thus, we controlled for the duration of a 
patient room stay.  
Room Entry    
    Indicator 
Several studies have shown that compliance with hand hygiene guidelines is 
lower prior to patient care than following patient care (WHO, 2009).  We 
constructed an indicator variable that was equal to one if a hand hygiene 
opportunity occurred at room entry; otherwise, this indicator was set equal to 
zero.  
Hour of the Day To control for the possibility that workflow differs at different times of the day 
or that people’s daily circadian rhythms influence their energy levels and 
attentional resources, we constructed indicator variables for each hour in the 24 
hour clock (00:00 hours through 23:00 hours; 01:00 hours is the omitted 
indicator in our analyses).  
Control Variables Listed below Were only Included When We Predicted Caregiver Compliance during 
the Post-activation Period 
Presence of Other 
Caregivers 
We relied on the time stamps of room entries and exits to identify whether other 
caregivers were in the same patient room when the caregiver in question entered 
or exited the room. We created an indicator variable which equaled one if at least 
one other caregiver was in the same patient room when the caregiver in question 
entered (or exited) the room and had a hand hygiene opportunity. 
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Table 2.   Means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables included in our analyses 
Panel A: Unit-Level dispenser usage data (N = 35,552) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Caregiver compliance data (N = 19,585,738) 
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Total Daily Usage Per Unit Bed 48.05 38.60 1.00
Activation 0.88 0.33 0.21* 1.00
Deactivation 0.01 0.12 -0.06* -0.32* 1.00
Pre-activation Usage 26.13 14.95 0.55* -0.02* 0.04* 1.00
Months Since Start 30.87 8.33 0.25* 0.23* 0.12* 0.11* 1.00
Day of the Week 4.00 2.00 -0.07* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
* p-value < .05
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Compliance 0.45 0.50 1.00
Months Since Activation 313.12 237.71 0.15* 1.00*
Months Since Start 31.24 7.77 0.30* 0.38* 1.00*
Day of the Week 3.88 1.95 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 1.00*
Hours at Work 5.49 9.70 -0.01* -0.04* 0.00* 0.01* 1.00*
Hours off Work 65.85 184.84 -0.02* 0.02* -0.01* -0.03* -0.01* 1.00*
Duration of a Patient Room Stay 0.09 0.15 0.03* 0.02* 0.03* 0.00 0.01* 0.01* 1.00*
Room Entry Indicator 0.50 0.50 -0.09* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 1.00
Hour of the Day 11.95 6.27 -0.01* -0.01* 0.00 -0.02* -0.03* 0.00* 0.01* -0.01* 1.00
Presence of Other Caregivers 0.10 0.30 0.00* -0.01* 0.02* -0.01* 0.01* 0.00* 0.03* 0.00 0.00* 1.00
* p-value < .05
Note.  In Table 2 Panels A-C,  months since start, day of the week, and hour of the day are treated as continuous variables. Our regression models include 
dummy indicators for each month, day of the week, and hour of the day as described in Table 1.
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Table 3. Model 1 examined the effects of activating individual electronic monitoring on total daily usage 
of hand hygiene dispensers per hospital unit per bed, and Model 2 examined whether a unit’s pre-
activation dispenser usage affected the monitoring effect. Model 3 examined the long-term effects of 
activating electronic monitoring on all caregivers’ individual hand hygiene compliance decisions. Model 
4 examined the effects of deactivating electronic monitoring on total daily usage of hand hygiene 
dispensers per hospital unit per bed. 
 
Table 4. Badged, Unbadged and Total Usage during visitor-free hours and throughout the entire day. 
 
 
Regression Outcome Variable
Did Caregivers Sanitize 
Their Hands at a Given 
Hand Hygiene 
Opportunity? (Y=1, N=0)
Total Daily 
Usage Per Unit 
Bed
Sample All Caregivers All Units
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
16.34*** 16.26*** 16.36***
(3.14) (3.01) (3.15)
0.49*
(0.21)
4.6e-03*
(1.8e-03)
-2.0e-04*
(8.3e-05)
-17.07**
(6.28)
Timing Controls1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hand Hygiene Opportunity Controls 2 N/A N/A Yes N/A
Hospital Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes N/A Yes
Caregiver Fixed Effects N/A N/A Yes N/A
Observations 35,048 35,048 19,585,738 35,552
Number of Hospital Units 71 71 71 71
Number of Caregivers N/A N/A 5,222 N/A
R2 0.65 0.65 0.26 0.64
Total Daily Usage 
Per Unit Bed
All Units
Activation
1 Timing controls include fuxed effects for each month in our data and day-of-the-week fixed effects.
2 Hand hygiene opportunity controls include hour-of-the-day fixed effects, the number of hours a caregiver had been at work since the start of a 
shift up to an hand hygiene opportunity, the length (in hours) of a work break from the preceding shift, the duration of a patient room stay, and 
whether or not a hand hygiene opportunity was associated with a room entry or a room exit. Models 4 and 5 also control for whether other 
caregivers were present at a given hand hygiene opportunity. Coefficients on all control variables are available from the authors upon request.
Pre-activation Usage (Mean Centered) X Activation
Months Since Activation (Mean Centered)
Months Since Activation^2
Deactivation
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital unit level.
Time of the Day
Pre-activation Post-activation Pre-activation Post-activation
Badged Usage
0.4
(pilot testers)
3.6
(caregivers wearing a 
badge)
3.2
(pilot testers)
22.5
(caregivers wearing a 
badge)
Unbadged Usage
3.7
(caregivers who were 
not pilot testers)
3.4
(caregivers not wearing 
a badge)
25.1
(caregivers who were not pilot 
testers + non-caregivers)
23.4
(caregivers not wearing a 
badge + non-caregivers)
Total Usage
4.1
(all caregivers)
6.9
(all caregivers)
28.3
(all caregivers + non-caregivers)
45.9
(all caregivers + non-
caregivers)
During visitor-free hours (12am-6am) Across the day
Notes: The numbers are mean values across all units for the 17 days before and 18 days (including the activation date) after monitoring 
activation. Usage refers to usage per unit per bed. Text in parentheses indicates the population of users. During visitor-free hours, we 
assume that caregivers (with or without a badge) are the primary users of dispensers. 
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Table 5. Models from Table 3 with the inclusion of intervention indicators. 
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline illustrating when the electronic monitoring system is installed, and when individual 
monitoring is activated and (in a small subset of cases) de-activated in a given hospital unit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Information sessions were held in advance of or at the time of when the majority of caregivers received an RFID badge 
prior to the activation date.  
 
 
 
Sample All Caregivers All Units
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
15.91*** 15.23*** 15.67***
(3.00) (2.59) (2.97)
0.54*
(0.25)
5.6e-03***
(1.5e-03)
-2.5e-04***
(6.7e-05)
-14.87*
(7.08)
Indicators for additional interventions
-3.94 -3.73 -0.01 -3.96
(3.67) (3.73) (0.02) (3.67)
Goal setting 5.05 4.81 0.01 5.84
(4.03) (4.09) (0.03) (3.90)
20.07*** 19.79*** 0.13*** 20.27***
(5.42) (5.29) (0.03) (5.48)
Competition 9.20 9.00 0.06* 8.28
(8.55) (8.13) (0.02) (7.98)
7.73 7.91 0.04^ 6.02
(6.29) (6.16) (0.02) (5.97)
Time Controls1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hand Hygiene Opportunity Controls 2 N/A N/A Yes N/A
Hospital Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes N/A Yes
Caregiver Fixed Effects N/A N/A Yes N/A
Observations 30,375 30,375 17,737,536 30,879
Number of Hospital Units 50 50 50 50
Number of  Caregivers 4,211
R2 0.66 0.67 0.26 0.66
2 Hand hygiene opportunity controls include hour-of-the-day fixed effects, the number of hours a caregiver had been at work since the start of a shift up to an hand 
hygiene opportunity, the length (in hours) of a work break from the preceding shift, the duration of a patient room stay, and whether or not a hand hygiene 
opportunity was associated with a room entry or a room exit. Model2 also controls for whether other caregivers were present at a given hand hygiene opportunity. 
Deactivation
Performance feedback
Leadership
Incentive
^, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital unit level.
1 Timing controls include fuxed effects for each month in our data and day-of-the-week fixed effects.
All Units
Activation
Pre-activation Usage (Mean Centered) X 
Activation
Days Since Activation (Mean Centered)
Days Since Activation^2
Stage 1 (pre-activation): 
Caregivers are aware of 
aggregate monitoring  
Stage 2 (post-activation): 
Caregivers are aware of 
individual monitoring  
 
Stage 3 (post-deactivation): 
Caregivers are aware of 
aggregate monitoring  
Installation  
Date 
Activation 
Date 
Deactivation  
Date 
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Figure 2. A plot of the average total daily dispenser usage per hospital unit per bed, average daily 
unbadged usage, and average daily counterfactual unbadged usage around the activation of individual 
electronic monitoring.  
 
Note. Counterfactual unbadged usage reflects an estimate of what unbadged usage would have been after monitoring 
activation if monitoring activation did not alter unbadged users’ compliance (see Appendix D for details). 
Figure 3. Plot of fitted hand hygiene compliance rate as function of months since activation.  
 
Note: Continuous control variables are assigned their mean value. Fixed effects for indicator variables are assigned 
the value of the relevant reference group omitted from our regressions.   
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